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CHAPTER 11 - PRIVATE PARTY VS. GOVERNMENTS,
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT:
FRANKENSTEIN OR SAFETY VALVE?
David R. Haigh, Q. C*.
Since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),1 took effect
in January, 1994, many of the deep concerns, which initially surrounded its
introduction, appear to have gradually abated. In fact, the commemorative
ceremonies marking- the fifth anniversary of the NAFTA last year were
generally highlighted by an impressive litany of trade statistics. Since the
implementation of the NAFTA, Canada's trade with the United States has
risen eighty percent, while trade with Mexico has doubled. In 1998, total
three-way trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United States reached
approximately $752 billion, with Canada-U.S. and Canada-Mexico trade
accounting for $484 billion. Since 1993, foreign direct investment in Canada
has risen by fifty-four percent to $218 billion, of which about sixty-eight
percent comes from the NAFrA parties.2 Measured by the increase of trade
and investment among the three North American economies, the NAFITA
appears to have been an unparalleled success.
While the trading benefits of the NAFFA appear to be broadly accepted,
there continue to be some dissenters who do not share the general enthusiasm
for NAFI7A's accomplishments. 3 Whether these critics are the same old
objectors who have simply persisted in their original viewpoint or whether
they speak to fresh concerns which have arisen since the implementation of
the NAFTA, their voices have, no doubt, gained considerable impetus in the
post "Battle in Seattle" environment. In particular, the investment provisions
Burnet Duckworth & Palmer, Calgary, Alberta, Canada.
North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 Dec. 1992, Can. T.S.
1994 No.2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 Jan. 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2 Dep't of Foreign Aft. and Int'l Trade, The NAFTA at Five Years: A Partnership at
Work, (visited July 20, 2000), <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/five-e.asp>.
3 Obviously, not everyone agrees that increased "marketization" and globalization have
been universally successful. Cf. Jay Mazur, Labour's New Internationalism (Jan./Feb., 2000)
FOREIGN AFF., at 79; Wendy Dobson, Fallout from the Global Financial Crisis: Should
Capitalism Be Curbed?," 54 INT'L J. OFTHE CAN. INST. OFINT'L AFF., at 375.
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and the investor-state dispute resolution regime of Chapter 11, have begun to
attract considerable negative attention.
On a broad basis, the apprehension is that each NAFTA country has sold
its sovereignty down the river by agreeing to subject itself to lawsuits by
investors who may seek not only damages, but may also attack these
governments at the heart of their policy making capacity. This would occur
because it is measures adopted or maintained by these governmental Parties
which are necessarily impugned in proceedings commenced by investors
under Chapter 11.4 A "measure" is defined in Article 201 as including "...
any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice." Thus, the regulatory
and legislative enactments of governmental Parties are subject to attack by
private investors where it is alleged that the underlying covenants applicable
to investors of another party, as set forth in Section A of Chapter 11, have
been breached.
To appreciate the potential breadth of the "measures" to which investors
may object, I propose to consider the example of some of the alleged causes
of action in the case of Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada (Ethyl v.
Canada),5 and the manner in which they were dealt with in the course of a
Hearing of preliminary objections by Canada, especially on the question of
whether any actionable measures existed at the required times in terms of the
arbitration procedures of the NAFTA.
In its original "Notice of Intent To Submit a Claim to Arbitration," dated
September 10, 1996 (Notice of Intent), Ethyl complained, inter alia, of a
previously announced intention by a Canadian Minister of the Environment
that the Government of Canada would remove MMT from use in Canada.
Ethyl further complained that the Government of Canada had attempted to
prohibit MMT by exercising its regulatory power over international and
interprovincial trade by introducing to Parliament Bill C-94, being an Act to
regulate interprovincial trade in and the importation for commercial
purposes of certain manganese-based substances. Bill C-94 did not complete
its passage through the House of Commons when Parliament was prorogued
at the end of January, 1996. In Canadian parliamentary practice, this has
traditionally meant that any pending but uncompleted legislative steps are
considered to have been suspended.
Subsequently, with the second session of the same Parliament resuming
in April of 1996, Canada reintroduced what Ethyl characterized as "this
4 See NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1101, (providing specifically that Chapter 11 applies
to measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to investors of another Party and
investments of another Party in the territory of the Party and, with respect to Articles 1106 and
1114, all investments in the territory of the Party).
5 Ethyl Corporation v. The Government of Canada, 38 I.L.M. 708, (1998).
[Vol. 26:115 2000]
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measure" to Parliament, referring the bill directly to third reading. By this
time, the Bill was renumbered as Bill C-29.6 Until third reading, the Bill
cannot be considered to have been passed by the House of Commons.
Moreover, it is then subject to consideration by the Senate where it must
likewise receive three readings and subsequently the formality of Royal
Assent before it becomes law. In this case, Bill C-29 went through not only
the formal readings in the House of Commons and the Senate, but at the
second reading stage in the Commons and the Senate it was also referred to
two Parliamentary Committees - the House of Commons Standing
Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development and the Senate
Standing Committee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources. Ethyl,
it was said, participated in the legislative process by various means, including
lobbying and appearing as a witness before the Senate Committee.7
In these circumstances, therefore, Ethyl was complaining in its Notice of
Intent of a putative measure which had not yet received third reading by the
House of Commons, had not yet been submitted at all to the Senate, and
certainly had not yet become law in any formal sense. Canada later pleaded:
When Ethyl delivered its Notice of Intent, debate on Bill C-29 had
not occurred and the Bill had not passed. In fact, debate on the Bill
began in the House of Commons on September 25, 1996 and
continued until December 2, 1996 when it was passed by the House
of Commons and sent to the Senate for consideration.8
Ethyl's Notice of Intent also complained of certain public statements
made by another Minister of the Environment indicating his concern with the
potential negative effect on the health *of Canadians caused by possible
interference of MMT on automobile computer systems monitoring tailpipe
emissions.
The potential significance of these events arises from the requirements of
Article 1119 of the NAFTA, which states, in part:
The disputing investor shall deliver to the Disputing Party written
notice to submit a claim to arbitration at least 90 days before the
claim is submitted....
6 Bill C-29, An Act to Regulate Interprovincial Trade in and the Importation for
Commercial Purposes of Certain Manganese-Based Substances, 2d Sess., 35 t' Parl., 1996
(Third reading, April 22, 1996).
7 Statement of Defence of the Government of Canada (27 Nov. 1997), at para. 9; Award
on Jurisdiction (June 24, 1998), at para. 78.
8 Statement of Defence of the Government of Canada, supra note 7, at para. 12.
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Ethyl had purported to comply with this provision by alleging, among
other things,
The recurring unsubstantiated statements made by officials of the
Government of Canada, including the Ministers of the Environment,
against the safety and environmental soundness of MMT, constitutes
such a measure [as defined in Article 201]. 9
Ethyl had further stated in its Notice of Intent at para. 20,
These governmental measures have resulted in harm to Ethyl
Corporation's property....
After the commencement of arbitral proceedings by Ethyl against Canada
and following the organization of the Tribunal, 0 a preliminary meeting and
the exchange of pleadings, Canada took a preliminary objection to the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on a number of grounds, including the objection
that Canada had not adopted or maintained a measure within the meaning of
Articles 201 and 1101 of the NAFTA at the time Ethyl submitted its claim to
arbitration.
Canada particularized its objections in this regard in a number of ways.
First, it stated that to the extent the claim made by Ethyl was based on
statements made in support of proposed legislation, those ministerial
statements were neither "measures" nor "measures relating to" "investors" or
"an investment" and were not, therefore, subject to proceedings under
Chapter 11. In addition, Canada stated that to the extent the claim was based
on the passage of a Bill through the House of Commons and the Senate of
Canada, passage of a Bill that had not yet come into force was neither a
measure nor was it a measure relating to an investment or an investor and
was, therefore, not properly the subject of Chapter 11 proceedings. Finally,
Canada took the view that the legislation complained of in Ethyl's Statement
of Claim had not been enacted nor had it come into force at the time the
claim was submitted and there could not be any measure relating to an
investment or an investor in effect upon which Ethyl could found any alleged
breach of any obligations under Chapter 11.11
9 Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (10 Sept. 1996), at para. 19.
10 The arbitral Tribunal in the Ethyl case, was composed of well-recognized and very
experienced arbitrators. Ethyl's nominee was Mr. Charles N. Brower. The Government of
Canada nominated Mr. Marc Lalonde. The Tribunal was chaired by Professor Dr. Karl-Heinz
Bockstiegel.
11 Statement of Defence of the Government of Canada, supra note 7 at para. 11-15, 22(b).
[Vol. 26:115 2000]
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In reply to Canada's arguments that there were no measures adopted or
maintained by it relating to Ethyl's investment either at the date of the Notice
of Intent (September 10, 1996), or at the date of the Notice of Arbitration
(April 14, 1997), Ethyl took the position that the MMTAct, which came into
force on June 24, 1997, was by that date undoubtedly a "measure" within the
meaning of Article 201.
In the Ethyl case, it is interesting to observe that Mexico exercised its
right to participate in the arbitration pursuant to Article 1128, which provides
that "...a Party may make submissions to a Tribunal on a question of
interpretation of NAFTA." Mexico pointed out, as did Canada in its
submissions, that:
[T]o properly be the subject of an investor-State arbitration, the
measure at issue must have been in effect at the time the arbitral
process was initiated. Given the express contemplation of proposed
measures in other parts of the NAFrA, this language cannot be
interpreted to reach proposed measures. In Mexico's submission,
therefore, the use of the words "adopt" and "maintain" means that
the measure complained of must already be in existence at the time
that the proceeding is initiated i.e. at the time the notice of claim is
filed pursuant to Article 1119.
This is particularly so in the case of Chapter Eleven, since a measure
that has not yet produced legal effects cannot cause damages for
which compensation or restitution may be due.
12
Mexico added that tribunals under Chapter 11 should adhere to the
requirements of Section B for the initiation of arbitration proceedings. In this
case, Mexico said, among other things, "... the claim should have been ripe at
the time that it was filed, and that the claimant not be permitted to change its
claim from a non-arbitral non-measure to an arbitrable measure during the
process."'
13
Ethyl replied to Mexico's points. It reiterated that a measure was adopted
when the MMTAct received Royal Assent and claimed, therefore,
[T]he only question presently before the Tribunal is whether Ethyl
violated a requirement to wait six months after the 'events giving rise
to the claim' and, if so, what is the proper remedy for this alleged
12 Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at para. 48(ii).
13 Iadat 48('iii).
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procedural breach. Thus, 'the Tribunal may never need to decide
what a measure is ' and, indeed, 'should avoid' doing so.
14
The stage was set, therefore, for this Tribunal to address some very
interesting points and potentially to provide some helpful guidance to others
who might need to determine how far into the legislative and policy making
process a private investor could reach in making its claim. Clearly in Chapter
20 of NAFTA there is provision for the resolution of disputes between the
Parties regarding the interpretation or application of NAFTA, "...wherever a
Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of another Party is or
would be inconsistent with the obligations of this Agreement..." [emphasis
added].1 5 That sort of state-to-state procedure could, theoretically, have been
instigated if the United States had chosen to construe the Bills before
Parliament or the ministerial statements as "proposed" measures with which
it wished to take issue. Could an investor, however, somehow manage to
claim the same privilege to dispute a proposed measure? As Canada had
argued, until the MMT Act took effect, there was no legislative prohibition,
which could have allegedly harmed Ethyl's investment. To extend the right
of the investor to advance its claim so as to encompass proposed enactments
would be, Canada and Mexico said, an unwarranted extension of the right of
private action to which the NAFTA Parties had consented.
The Tribunal's consideration of the question of whether there were
measures in play which could warrant the bringing of proceedings by an
investor under Chapter 11, is instructive in several respects, and some would
argue that it illustrates very well the problematic procedure to which the
NAFTA Parties have subscribed. The waiver of sovereign immunity in the
form of their consent to actions brought under Chapter 11, by Canada, the
United States, and Mexico, some would argue, may have opened the
floodgates to an overall loss of sovereignty.
With respect to the preliminary objections, for the most part, the Tribunal
dismissed Canada's jurisdictional objections, including in particular, its
position that no arbitration proceedings under Chapter 11 could be pursued
unless a measure had been adopted or maintained by Canada by the date of
the Notice of Arbitration.
At the beginning of its analysis of Canada's objections, the Tribunal
noted Canada's Statement on Implementation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement,16 at page 80, which stated:
14 Id. at para. 49.
15 NAFTA, supra note 1, at article 2004: Recourse to Dispute Settlement Procedures.
16 North American Free Trade Agreement, Canadian Statement on Implementation,
C.Gaz. 1994.1.68 [hereinafter the Canadian Statement on Implementation].
[Vol. 26:115 20001
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The term 'measure' is a non-exhaustive definition of the ways in
which governments impose discipline in their respective
jurisdictions.
After referring to Article 201 of NAFTA, the Tribunal stated "Clearly
something other than a 'law,' even something in the nature of a 'practice'
which may not even amount to a legal stricture, may qualify.
' 17
While acknowledging Canada's argument "...that an unenacted legislative
proposal, which is unlikely to have resulted even in a 'practice,' cannot
constitute a measure," the Tribunal nonetheless appears to fix upon the
obvious situation that had emerged.
In the end, however, the MMTAct did come into force 24 June 1997,
after having received Royal Assent on 25 April, 1997, just eleven
days following the Claimant's delivery of its Notice of Arbitration.
The MMTAct is, Canada concedes, a measure within the meaning of
Article 1101(1). Canada's objection, then, is that Ethyl 'jumped the
gun,' and, having done so, should be requested to commence an
entirely new arbitration, which, it is conceded, it can (subject to any
scope limitations). 18
After reciting that the MMT Act, based on Ethyl's allegations, was the
realization of a legislative program of the Canadian Government, sustained
over a period of time, the Tribunal again noted, "In any event, the MMT Act
is, as of 24 June 1997, a reality, and therefore the Tribunal is now presented
with a claim based on a "measure" which has been "adopted or maintained"
within the meaning of Article 1101." 9
This conclusion, without more, in this writer's view, does not meet the
point of Canada's (and Mexico's) objection that Ethyl's complaint was not
properly arbitral on April 14, 1997 when the Notice of Arbitration was
issued. Under Article 1137, a claim is submitted to arbitration when, in the
case of UNCITRAL proceedings, the Notice of Arbitration is received by the
disputing party. Either there was a viable claim on that date or there was not.
The repeated reference by the Tribunal to the fact that, subsequently to the
date of the Notice of Arbitration, the MMT Act was indeed a 'measure" as
contemplated by Article 1101 really does not resolve the issue raised by
Canada.
The question of what stage a measure must reach in order to permit
pursuit of a claim under Chapter 11 was further considered by the Tribunal in
17 Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at para. 66.
S' Id. at paras. 67-68.
19 Id. at para. 69.
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the context of what it characterized as "...several procedural requirements to
which Canada points." 20 While the Tribunal reviewed the arguments
concerning whether Articles 1118, 1119, and 1120, dealing with
consultation, 2' Notice of Intent, and Notice of Arbitration, respectively, could
be complied with in a timely way in the absence of a measure which had
already been adopted or maintained, it nonetheless concluded there was no
need to address these arguments,
[S]ince the fact is that in any event six months and more have passed
following Royal Assent to Bill C-29 and the coming into force of the
MMT Act. It is not doubted that today Claimant could resubmit the
very claim advanced here (subject to any scope limitations). No
disposition is evident on the part of Canada to repeal the MMTAct or
amend it. Indeed, it could hardly be expected. Clearly a dismissal of
the claim at this juncture would disserve, rather than serve, the object
and purpose of NAFTA.
In the specific circumstances of this case the Tribunal decides that
neither Article 1119 nor 1120 should be interpreted to deprive this
Tribunal of jurisdiction.22
This conclusion, as with the earlier one on the ambit of the term "measure,"
simply does not meet Canada's arguments. Either there was a claim, in the
sense that an impugnable measure had been adopted or maintained by
Canada at the dates of the Notice of Intention or the Notice of Arbitration,
respectively, or there was not. The decision by this Tribunal avoids the
burden of this issue by resorting instead to the applicable rules of treaty
interpretation found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
23(Vienna Convention), in particular Articles 31 and 32.
In a footnote to its conclusion, the Tribunal justifies its result by tracking
the language of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which states:
20 Id. at paras. 74-88.
21 During argument on jurisdiction, Ethyl complained that Canada had failed to comply
with Article 1118, which requires that, "The disputing parties should first attempt to settle a
claim through consultation or negotiation." While one meeting did occur after delivery of
Ethyl's Notice of Intent, on November 12, 1996, Canada disputed that it was a "consultation."
This position led the Tribunal to speculate in a footnote to the Award, that the Canadian
officials feared that admitting a "consultation" might compromise the position that Bill C-94,
then pending third reading in the House of Commons, was not a "measure." Id. at paras. 76-
78.
22 Id. at para. 85.
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M.
679, (entered into force on Jan. 27, 1980).
[Vol. 26:115 2000]
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Article 31. General Rules of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the Treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.
What the Tribunal stated in its footnote to its conclusion was:
Specifically, the Tribunal concludes that this results from
interpreting those Articles in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms thereof in their context
and in the light of the object and purpose of NAFTA as prescribed by
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and that, considering
particularly the circumstances of NAFTA's conclusion, any different
interpretation would lead to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable within the meaning of Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention.
This last reference is to the following wording from the Vienna Convention:
Article 32. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) Leads to a result, which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
The Tribunal completed its Award in this respect with two sets of
observations and a cost disposition. Firstly, it acknowledged that Ethyl may
have "jumped the gun" for tactical reasons relating to the legislative process.
In this regard, the Tribunal noted the proximity of the Notice of Intent, on
September 10, 1996 to the commencement of debate on Bill C-29 on third
reading which commenced September 25, 1996, recognizing that the
"claimant may have decided to file its Notice of Intent on September 10,1996
for the purpose of affecting that debate."24 It further observed that one of the
witnesses for Ethyl stated that on February 5, 1997 (after Bill C-29 had
passed the House of Commons), representatives from Ethyl appeared before
24 Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at para. 87.
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the Senate Standing Committee and offered to resolve the dispute by not
proceeding with its pending NAFTA claim if the Government of Canada
would not pass Bill C-29. Subsequently, the Notice of Arbitration was
delivered "right on the heels of Senate passage of Bill C-29, i.e. five days
later.
25
Finally, the Tribunal held:
Had Ethyl first awaited Royal Assent to Bill C-29, and then bided its
time another six months, the Tribunal would not have been required
to deal with this issue. The Tribunal deems it appropriate to decide,
therefore, that claimant should bear the costs of the proceedings on
jurisdiction insofar as these issues are involved.
What is to be made of this case in the context of the general debate on
whether Chapter 11 is in any way problematic for the Parties that created it?
We should recall, of course, Article 1136(1) which provides:
Article 1136: Finality and Enforcement on an Award
1. An award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except
between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case.
Therefore, it is arguable that this particular decision is of limited
significance, confined basically to its peculiar circumstances and without
general application. The problem with that approach is that, notwithstanding
Article 1136(1), in the next Chapter 11 case where an investor is seeking to
extend its claim as to what may properly be a measure, there is no doubt that
this Award will be referred to as authoritative and a model to be followed.
For example, in a very recent case comment on this Award, Alan C. Swan of
the University of Miami School of Law wrote:
If the Tribunal's decision had rested solely on a pragmatic sense that
Ethyl's defaults were simply not serious enough to warrant dismissal
of its claim, there would be little reason to take note of the decision.
But there is a good deal more to the decision that that. It is highly
principled, rooted in an interpretive methodology that, in the writer's
view, is a model for the application of Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention),
and a powerful riposte to the "formalism" that is increasingly
creeping into the interpretation of treaties, constitutions, statues, and
even private contracts. It reflects an interpretive methodology that
2 id.
[Vol. 26:115 2000]
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recommends itself for future NAFTA arbitrations, whether under
Chapter 11 or under Chapters 19 and 20.26
Professor Swan's position will, no doubt, be shared in due course by
other investors and claimants who wish, for tactical reasons to "jump the
gun" and affect the debate which, in a usually free and democratic process
may be a source of some concern.
The Ethyl case, therefore, illustrates generally why some of the concern
that is currently expressed in each of the NAFTA countries may be
warranted. Obviously, if governmental statements of policy and statements of
ministerial intention to introduce legislation are, in themselves, actionable,
Chapter 11 potentially creates an opportunity for foreign corporations from
one of the Parties investing in the territory of one of the other Parties to
attempt to influence the legislative process and potentially even to impede
the passage of legislation or the exercise of regulatory power which would
otherwise be legitimate behavior for autonomous governments to pursue.
Should that effect be considered to be in accordance with the ordinary
meaning of the terms of NAFTA in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose?
In the Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, "Frankenstein" is
defined as "... the name of the title-character of Mrs. Shelley's romance
Frankenstein (1818), who constructed a human monster and endowed it with
life. Commonly misused allusively as a typical name for a monster who is a
terror to his originator and ends by destroying him."
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language more succinctly
defines Frankenstein as, "... a person who creates a monster or destructive
agency that he cannot control or that brings about his own ruin."
The debate in the Ethyl case concerning the meaning and ambit of the
term "measure" may suggest there is some substance to the argument that the
NAFTA parties have inadvertently created a destructive agency which they
now cannot control and which might, in some ways, arguably bring about
their ruin. While that proposition may. be somewhat inflated, it nevertheless
highlights the principal areas for concern, namely, that public policies can
now be potentially affected by arbitral panels which are completely outside
the usual public policy-making process. Generally speaking, the NAFTA
parties have given to investors coming into their territorial jurisdiction from
one of the other Parties, a right of redress against them which has not been
granted even to their own citizens since governmental measures in each of
the NAFTA countries would not, ordinarily, be subject to action by corporate
citizens within those countries.
26 Ethyl, supra note 5.
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Nor, it should be further noted, is the possible breadth of the interpretation of
the term "measure" in Article 1101 the only area for concern. For example,
some have become alarmed at the frequency with which claimants have been
relying on the very broad wording of Article 1110. As one of the underlying
assurances to investors, it has been given some very innovative
interpretations in various claims made against the NAFTA Parties. The
following examples are illustrative of the characterization of various
measures as expropriation:
S.D. Meyers Inc., the Ohio-based corporation engaged in processing,
transportation and disposal of waste contaminated with PCBs,
alleged that: 'The effect of the PCB Export Bans [implemented by
the Government of Canada] has been to [totally] frustrate the
Canadian operations of the Investor. This has resulted in the
deprivation of the benefits of the Investor's investment in Canada,
constituting a measure tantamount to expropriation."
2 7
The Loewen Group, Inc., the Vancouver-based funeral services
company alleged that a Mississippi jury award of $500 million
(including $74 million in damages for emotional distress and $400
million in punitive damages), the application of a 125% appeal bond
requirement, and a coerced settlement "had the effect of severely
infringing and interfering with Loewen's property rights, and thus
,,28
were tantamount to expropriation.
Robert Azinian et al, as shareholders of a Mexican corporation with
a concession contract for waste disposal, argued that the repudiation
of the contract constituted an expropriation "if the state exercises its
executive or legislative authority to destroy the contractual rights as
an asset. 29
The portion of Article 1110 on which some of this attention is focused
provides as follows:
27 S.D. Meyers Inc. v. Government of Canada, "Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to
Arbitration" (21 July 1998), at para. 14.
28 Lowen Group, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Claim, Oct. 31, 1998, at para. 167; see
also Harmonization Project, Briefing Paper, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (visited July
28, 2000) <http://www.harmonizationalert.org/NAFrA/loewen.htm>.
29 Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States,
"Award" (1 Nov. 1999), Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes), at paras. 87-89.
[Vol. 26:115 2000]
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Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an
investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment ("expropriation") except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1);
and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with Paragraphs 2
through 6.
Significantly Article 1110(2) provides:
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took
place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not reflect any change in
value occurring because the intended expropriation had become
known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value,
asset value including declared tax value of tangible property, and
other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value.
Having in mind the earlier discussion on the interpretation of the term
"measure" in the Ethyl case, where a governmental Party has committed
itself to adhere to a standard such as not taking a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation, it may discover in due course that its
presumed sovereign discretion to legislate and regulate has indeed been
materially curtailed. As explained earlier, the definition of measure in Article
201, "... includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice."
Consequently, a governmental Party may find itself accountable for a
practice or requirement that is merely tantamount to expropriation. It is
debatable whether such action would qualify as the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, a taking for which most domestic governmental authorities
would ordinarily expect to compensate the expropriated party.
13
Haigh: Chapter 11--Private Party vs. Governments, Investor-State Dispute
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2000
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
The language of Article 1110(1) suggests that the drafters of NAFTA
were intent on casting a wider net than merely the traditional form of
expropriation which compulsory taking by an authority ordinarily implies.
It is appropriate, therefore, to ask what are the underlying philosophical
considerations that appear to have created the Chapter 11 regime? In other
words, is there some valid philosophical or practical objective that would
justify the extraordinary rights that appear to have been granted to investors
under Chapter 11 of NAFTA? Or have the parties to NAFTA inadvertently,
simply undermined their viability as nation states? Is Chapter 11 indeed a
Frankenstein?
What can we discern about the philosophical foundations of Chapter 11
from its language and upon which we can place the burden of its potentially
far reaching application?
It is my opinion that the fundamental objective of Chapter 11 of NAFTA
is to create a bargain between host states and investors. The terms of this
bargain are that those who respond to the invitation from the host country to
invest their expertise and other resources in that state may be assured that the
basic standards of fairness spelled out in Section A of Chapter 11 will be
fully observed by the host government. When the private party has
committed its wherewithal in the territory of the host government, it is
subject to all the law making authority of that government. Such investors do
not have the same relationship with that government that ordinary citizens
have. Consequently, they do not have the usual political recourse nor any
legitimate role in the public policy process. They are, therefore, uniquely
vulnerable to the legislative or regulatory whims of their host.
In the development of most bilateral investment treaties, the response to
this vulnerability has usually been to set out the basic standards of fairness
which should be observed, leaving the task of ensuring full adherence either
to inter-governmental dispute resolution procedures or, alternatively, to some
form of investor-state dispute mechanism. Thus, for example, in the Canada-
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) the parties committed themselves to
dispute settlement procedures dealing with anti-dumping and countervailing
duty matters. In addition, the parties agreed to resolve any other disputes
between them through well-defined, somewhat elaborate arbitral procedures.
[Neither of these dispute procedures, however, provided for recourse by
investors who are frequently the ones mostly directly affected by
governmental measures.] When the FTA entered into force on January 1,
1989, the emphasis was on fostering liberalized trade, more than creating
basic rules for investment. If there were issues, from time to time, between
foreign investors and the respective host governments, FTA did not purport
to deal with them. Outside investors had no higher rights than other corporate
[Vol. 26:115 2000]
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citizens in their dealings with governmental authority and, often, they had
fewer rights to the extent that they were subject to foreign investment
controls.
In their book, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete
Stevens have outlined the development of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
in the 20 th Century.30 Dolzer and Stevens have pointed out how various BITs
have acknowledged the importance of promoting private investment. For
example, they cite Article 258 of the Lom6 Convention, which acknowledges
that the promotion of private investment would need to include binding
obligations to:
(b) accord fair and equitable treatment to such investors;
(c)take measures and actions which help to create and maintain a
predictable and secure investment climate as well as enter into
negotiations on agreements which will improve such climate[.]
Proceeding from such broad policy footings, hundreds of bilateral
investment treaties around the world have created the means for investors to
hold their host governments accountable for their official actions.
Virtually all modem treaties provide for the arbitral settlement of
investment disputes, generally by reference to institutional or other
pre-existing arbitration rules. The overwhelming majority of BTs
contain a reference to ICSID. However there is also a significant
number of treaties that refer to arbitration under the UNCTRAL
Rules or to ICC Arbitration. In fact, most modem treaties allow for
the possibility of a choice between different arbitral regimes.31
When the NAFTA introduced Chapter 11 to the North American
consciousness, it may have surprised those who had become accustomed to
the old inter-governmental dispute mechanisms of the FTA. But, clearly
Chapter 11 added a whole new element to the trade liberalization scheme of
the FTA. NATA's Chapter 11 is, in essence, a tri-lateral investment treaty
grafted onto an arrangement which is otherwise largely directed at
establishing liberalization and fairness in the trade of goods and services. As
with "virtually all modem treaties" of this nature, as noted by Stevens and
Dolzer, there is provision for the settlement of investor-state investment
disputes under either the ICSID Convention, the Additional Facility Rules of
30 RULDOF DoLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (1995).
3, id. at 129.
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ICSID, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.32 In this respect, at least,
NAFTA Chapter 11 is hardly novel. Rather, as an investment treaty, it has
simply followed the already well-established model for investor-state dispute
resolution.
Why then would this arrangement, nevertheless, seem to arouse such
concern? Chapter 11 is the first time that Canada and the United States, both
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), have agreed to investor-state arbitration between themselves. In this
regard, it is important to note some of the characteristics of the economic
relationship, which has developed, first between Canada and the United
States, and subsequently with Mexico. In the period following World War II,
the pattern of trading and investment between Canada and the United States
began to change dramatically. Up until then, trade was divided between its
so-called "mother country," Great Britain and the United States. Following
the War, however, the United States had become the largest single customer
for Canadian exports and the greatest single source of its foreign investment.
For the last half of the 2e t Century, therefore, Canada and the United States
shared the distinction of being one another's largest customers. Throughout
that era, there were continuing inter-governmental communications on this
significant trading relationship. Some of the talking led to specific
agreements, such as the Auto Pact arrangements.33 Mostly, however, each
government legislated and regulated on trade and investment issues from a
domestic perspective. In the context of this, let us say traditional, trading
relationship, private investment disputes, generally speaking, required
investors in the two countries to resort to one another's courts and to rely on
private international law for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in one another's courts. Recourse by foreign investors against host
governments was basically non-existent.
With the introduction of the NAFTA negotiations, however, several of
the features which had characterized trading and investment between Canada
and the United States until then, underwent significant review.
It is no secret that at first Canada was somewhat hesitant to join the trade
discussions, which had been initiated between the United States and Mexico.
It was obvious, however, that the Administration of President Bush was
intent on vigorously pursuing the favorable climate for its talks with Mexico,
and Canada accordingly joined in. There was, in any event, some very large
and important policy considerations leading the United States to encourage
32 NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1120: Submission of a Claim to Arbitration.
33 See Paul Wonnacott, Autos and the Free Trade Agreement: Toward a More Secure
Trading Relationship, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE: THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT 271 (Marc Gold & David Leyton-Brown eds. 1988) (discussing the Auto Pact).
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the economic prosperity of its Spanish-speaking neighbor. To the extent that
Mexico has since the inception of NAFTA relatively quickly become the
second largest trading partner of the United States, after Canada, replacing
Japan in that respect, the aspirations of those who moved to integrate Mexico
into a North American market have been more than fulfilled.
If Mexico was prospectively to enjoy the full benefits of increased trade
and investment which NAFTA's framework was set up to encourage,
however, then Mexico, among other things, would have to be perceived as a
fair and reliable host country. Historically, the Calvo doctrine, based on a
decision of the Argentinian jurist Carlos Calvo in 1896, had been embraced
in Mexico as elsewhere in Latin America. Pursuant to this doctrine, rules
governing foreign investment were to be based on the concept of national
treatment and that the rules of domestic law should not be modified by
international law principles.34 It also meant that claims by foreign investors
could be brought only before Mexico's domestic courts. In addition, it was
well known that Mexico was subject, from time to time, to nationalistic
storms that were not always good news for foreign investors.35
Providing a framework which would potentially create the world's largest
common market was further complicated, in this instance, by the challenge of
balancing the claims of the world's largest national economy with the
different, but in each case much smaller economies of its two neighbors, one
well-developed and the other state-dominated and still developing.
Placed against these background circumstances, the question arises
whether the NAFTA Parties should have agreed, in the investment provisions
of Chapter 11, to such an invasion of their national autonomy? Could they
have settled for something more modest and less invasive?
When examined in the context of hundreds of other investment treaties,
and having regard to the underlying covenant which defines the investor-
state relationship, the real question, in my opinion, ought to be how could the
NAFTA negotiators have undertaken to do anything less than what they
achieved with Chapter 11. It is true, of course, that it entails some limited
waiver of sovereign immunity which is not very comfortable for those whose
political sense of survival leads them to look to strong state-led actions.
However, it is important to remember some of the objectives of NAFTA
which are set out in Article 102.
Article 102: Objectives
34 DOLZER, supra note 30, at 8.
35 Nationalistic storms were not limited to Mexico as certain laws in both Canada and the
United States would attest.
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The objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically
through its principles and rules, including national treatment, most-
favored-nation treatment and transparency, are to:
(a) eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the
Parties;
(b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area;
(c) increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories
of the Parties;
(d) establish a framework for further trilateral, regional and
multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this
Agreement.
The framework of Chapter 11 is admirably created to achieve these
objectives.
It is also important to recall at least three of the resolutions set forth by
the Parties in the Preamble to NAFrA, namely, to:
ENSURE a predictable commercial framework for business planning
and investment;
CREATE new employment opportunities and improve working
conditions and living standards in their respective territories;
PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare.
Pursuing these goals will require a balancing of public and private interests.
To have laid out the laudable objectives of national treatment, most-favored-
nation treatment, and transparency together with the undertaking in Article
1110 on expropriation and nationalization, as prescribed in Section A of
Chapter 11, without creating an effective enforcement procedure would, in
the end have amounted only to a lot of pious, but relatively meaningless,
words.
Therefore, Chapter 1l's Section B is anything but a Frankenstein
creation. It is, in fact, a bold creative step by which the goals of economic
fairness are most likely to be achieved. If governments are obliged to adjust
course because of a few successful claims brought pursuant to Chapter 11
[Vol. 26:115 2000]
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that will signal not the demise of the nation state, so much as it will confirm
economic democracy in North America.
Making the governmental parties directly accountable to those whose
economic interests may be unlawfully harmed, contrary to Chapter 11, is our
best assurance that NAFTA's highest goals will be achieved.
One further footnote that I would add is the outcome of the Ethyl case, for
those not familiar with it, was that, after the award on jurisdiction was
rendered by the Tribunal, it was settled. Canada paid Ethyl approximately
thirteen million dollars (U.S.) in compensation, and withdrew its legislation.
What is not often recognized, however, is that prior to that act of
settlement, a very interesting event had also occurred in Canada quite apart
from the Chapter 11 proceedings.
In Canada, we have an agreement on internal trade, which reflects a lot of
the same trade undertakings which are contained in Chapter 11 itself, only
the agreement is among the provinces and the government of Canada.
Under the agreement on internal trade, if there is a dispute among the
provinces or the government of Canada as to whether one or the governments
has breached its undertakings in that agreement, arbitral proceedings may be
brought.
This happened in this case. The Province of Alberta, my home province,
brought a complaint against the government of Canada with respect to the
legislation of the MMT Act. It was joined or supported in this respect by the
Province of Quebec and the Province of Saskatchewan.
That case was heard, and the decision on the proceedings, the Agreement
on Internal Trade (AIT), was rendered about a month before the award under
the NAFTA jurisdictional hearing. And that decision was adverse to Canada.
The tribunal in that case made a clear finding that Canada had exceeded its
legislative authority, had breached its undertakings in the Agreement on
Internal Trade.
And so I would like to remind people that it was not just the award on
jurisdiction, which ultimately led to the settlement that occurred. I want to
just say that, in my view, bad decisions, or disappointing decisions, should
not be deemed to undermine the process. The process is a good one, and I
strongly advocate it.
As a footnote, I would offer two proposals. It is my hope that as the
experience with the Chapter 11 dispute resolution procedures grows there
will be developed an open, transparent reporting system so that all who are
interested may follow the cases as they occur, from time to time. In due
course, the Parties may eventually wish to modify Article 1136(1) so that a
body of jurisprudence may grow from the decision making, a jurisprudence
which could be considered at least of persuasive, if not precedential, value.
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We know that a common law, developed case by case, occasionally
moderated by legislated enactments, is always good insurance against
tyranny and state excess. Thus the balance of public and private interests can
continue to be served.
Secondly, I would advocate a much more open, transparent disclosure of
the proceedings in these cases, limited only by proper concerns for
confidentiality of proprietary business information.
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